I have only just now fully appreciated the following argument that the reality of the existence of a qualified idea of a Christian, or any benevolent God, is defensible.

The traditional charge against a benevolent Being is that there is suffering and pain in the world and a benevolent Being could not have let this happen if it is in our interest to love Him. This is a valid and weighty charge. Specifically, a benevolent Being cannot be simultaneously omnipotent and omniscient, or else ceases to be benevolent. Most Christians and proponents of the reality of benevolent Beings do not acquiesce to the charge, and hence the contradiction. But a benevolent Being could forgo His omnipotence by introducing free will and resultant suffering, with the condition that free will allows a world in which a greater degree of benevolence is realized in spite of the introduction of pain. I do not accept the possibility of a benevolent Being retaining his omnipotence and only desires not to intercede in the world. In my opinion, as soon as a benevolent, omnipotent Being decides not to save an innocent person from suffering that Being has ceased to be benevolent.

I do not like this position, and hope that it is untrue, but I believe that anyone must admit that it is defensible, i.e., it is possible. I do not like the position in the sense that I do not agree with the supposed God's contemplations of what constitutes benevolence, I think I'd rather remain in blissful ignorance. Perhaps that is only opinion, and thus we are led to the first dead end.

The other dead ends, more important, are highlighted by the fact that this position does not address more fundamental problems implicit in accepting it. It does not prove the reality of free will as against determinism, and it does not prove the reality of the existence of a benevolent Being, or any Being, for that matter.

Perhaps it does have some utility in justifying the reality of suffering, if an acceptance of free will is allowed, regardless of source.