I just finished Keith Campbell's "Body and Mind." I figured I would expose myself to alternate theories but, surprisingly, the read did nothing to convince me that reductionism, or central-state materialism, as he calls it, isn't the ticket. He concocts an 'epiphenomenalism', believing that certain inner states of mind are indistinguishable from behavioral diagnoses and outer investigation, such as types of pain. For example, we can deduce that a man is experiencing a burning pain if he acts in burning-pain-alleviating ways and if he describes his pain in burning-pain terms. But we cannot really know that he describes it as such and acts in the same manner and experiences the same pain, and not, for example, a crushing pain. He may be an 'imitation man', and there is no way of knowing.

I credit Campbell for diagnosing a problem, but his solution is more of the same, in my opinion. There is no way of knowing what another man's mind is truly like. However, the more logical route is to acknowledge that science, inductive reasoning, and physical observation has not produced the answer yet. Though that is unsatisfactory to the ears, or eyes, guessing that there is a spiritual, non-physical cause and basis is more of the same and will likely meet the same end that similar guesses have endured since the rise of science. Moreover, why assume that another man's mind and inner states, with reference to his behavior, are significantly different in the first place? If a man has burned his finger, is crying in pain, puts ice on his finger, treats it tenderly....I think it is safe to assume that his burning sensation is quite like my burning sensation. Why assume a significant difference?

Dualism and the rest aren't really worth mentioning.

The Mind-Body problem arises from (4) incompatible propositions, while any (3) are mutually compatible:

(1) The body is a material thing
(2) The mind is a spiritual thing
(3) The mind and body interact
(4) Spirit and matter do not interact

I reject (2)

The mind is the brain, and nothing more.